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endogenous and output is produced from labor and capital by two sectors, dirty and clean. 
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shift increases labor demand and wages. This, in turn, raises the opportunity cost of rearing 
a child, thereby decreasing fertility and the population size. Correspondingly, if the clean 
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1 Introduction
Can environmental policy boost population growth, thus making a successful
wedding of high per capita consumption and clean environment ever harder
for the generations to become? This paper shows that the the environmental
policy, implemented by taxing the dirty sector, works in anti-natal direction
only as long as the dirty sector is the more capital intensive one. Today, this
is the case, mainly because productive capital exploits fossil fuels. But this
may change! The novel clean-energy technologies, e.g. windmills and solar
energy, utilize massive amounts of capital relative labor. Furthermore, many
productive tasks of men may be replaced by clean robots and people may
migrate to child rearing. Thus, the rise of the clean industry may generate
an unintended natal side-effect. In this paper, we explore this possibility by a
model of tree elements: the Stolper-Samuelson effect on resource allocation,
endogenous fertility, and environmental mortality.
The Stolper-Samuelson effect (1941). Consider a two-sector economy that
produces the final good according to two technologies (sectors), dirty and
clean. A tax on the dirty sector curbs its production shifting capital to the
clean one. If the dirty sector is capital intensive, then every shifted unit of
capital demands more labor than before and wages rise. Correspondingly, if
the clean sector is capital intensive, then a shifted unit of capital demands
less labor and wages fall.
Endogenous fertility (Becker 1981). The demand for children depends
on the opportunity cost of having a child. An emission tax shifts resources
between the sectors generating changes in wages. If wages rise, then the
opportunity cost of child increases and people move from child-rearing to
the labor market so that fertility decreases. If, in contrast, wages fall, then
fertility increases. Thus, emission taxes may have unintended demographic
effects.
Environmental mortality (Lehmijoki 2013). There is more and more
evidence on environmental degradation harming human health (Lehmijoki
2013). Following Lehmijoki and Rovenskaya (2010), we assume that mortal-
ity is an increasing function of total pollution which is a public good. For
example, ambient air pollution harms all people equally. This provides the
government every incentive to curb down dirty production by a pollution
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tax, but simultaneous changes in fertility may generate the opposite effect.
In the literature, De la Croix and Gosseries (2012) analyse the natalist
bias of pollution control as follows. Polluting emissions can be decreased
either by cutting down production per capita or by reducing the size of pop-
ulation. Emission taxes or quotas shift people from production to tax-free ac-
tivities, such as reproduction. This deteriorates the environment even more,
entailing the need to impose ever more stringent pollution rights per person.
Consequently, future generations will face increasing population associated
with decreasing production per capita.
Our model differs from de Croix and Gosseries (2012) in the following
respects. First, they assume only one technology, but we two alternative
technologies: dirty and clean. Consequently, emissions are proportional to
total output in their model, but only to dirty output in our model. Second,
they ignore physical capital and assume that spending on education accu-
mulates human capital, while we assume that private saving accumulates
aggregate capital (i.e. human and physical capital taken together). Thus, in
our model, the allocation of capital and labor between the two sectors rather
than aggregate capital plays an decisive role in pollution. Third, population
growth decreases fertility through congestion in their model, but increases
mortality through dirty output and pollution in our model.
The differences between the models lead to different policy recommenda-
tions for curbing pollution. De la Croix and Gosseries (2012) are pessimistic
about the efficiency of taxation and quotas and suggest the use of population
capping schemes in environmental policy. In contrast, we consider taxation
as an efficient tool, but warn that its impact depends decisively on the inten-
sity of the sectors: an emission tax alleviates pollution when the dirty sector,
but aggravates that when the clean sector is more capital intensive.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 builds up a
two-sector model of production and Section 3 focus on a family-optimization
with endogenous fertility. Sections 4 and 5 construct the dynamics of the
model and compare the traditional case where the dirty sector is more cap-
ital intensive with the modern case where the clean sector is more capital
intensive. The results are summarized in Section 6.
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2 The economy as a whole
Let N be population in the economy. The rate of population growth, f −m,
is the difference between the fertility rate f and mortality rate m:
N˙
N
.
=
1
N
dN
dt
= f −m, N(0) = N0, (1)
where t is time. We normalize the units so that it takes one unit of labor
to rear one newborn. Then, total labor in child rearing is equal to the
total number of newborns fN . Labor devoted to production, L, is equal to
population N minus labor in child rearing, fN :
L = N − fN = (1− f)N. (2)
There is only one numeraire good that is consumed C and invested in
capital. There are are two sectors that produce the good, clean and dirty.
Clean output Yc does not emit at all, but dirty output Yd emits in one-to-one
proportion. The government sets the tax x on emissions (the output of the
dirty sector) Yd and distributes the tax revenue xYd to the families through
a poll transfer s:
xYd = sN. (3)
Capital K and labor devoted to production, L, are transferable between
the sectors:
L ≥ Lc + Ld, K ≥ Kc +Kd, (4)
where Lj and Kj are labor and capital in each sector j ∈ {c, d}, respectively.
The production functions for sectors j ∈ {c, d} are
Yj = F
j(Kj, Lj), F
j
K > 0, F
j
L > 0, F
j
KK < 0, F
j
LL < 0, F
j
KL > 0,
F j linearly homogeneous, (5)
where the subscripts K and L denote the partial derivatives of the function
F j with respect to inputs Kj and Lj, correspondingly.
Let us denote the per capita terms
c
.
= C/N , k
.
= K/N and ki
.
= Kj/N and li
.
= Lij/N for j ∈ {c, d}. (6)
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Then, dividing (2), (4) and (5) by population N yields
k ≥ kc + kd, 1− f ≥ lc + ld, (7)
yc
.
= Yc/N = F
c(kc, lc), yd
.
= Yd/N = F
d(kd, ld). (8)
3 The representative family
The representative family takes the mortality rate m, the tax x and the poll
transfer s as given. Because it can save only in capital K, which is the only
asset in the model, its budget is given by
K˙
.
=
dK
dt
= Yc + Yd + sN − xYd − C − δK, K(0) = K0, δ > 0, (9)
where Yc + Yd is factor revenue from production, sN poll transfers, xYd,
emission taxes, C consumption and δ the depreciation rate of capital. Noting
(1), (5), (6), (8) and (13), the constraint (9) can be written in terms of capital
per head, k = K/N , as follows:
k˙ =
K˙
N
− K
N
N˙
N
= F c(kc, lc) + (1− x)F d(kd, ld) + s− c+ (m− f − δ)k,
k(0) = k0. (10)
Following Razin and Ben-Zion (1975) and Becker (1981), we assume that
at each time t, a representative family derives temporary utility u(t) from
per capita consumption c(t)
.
= C(t)/N(t) and fertility f(t) so that these are
substitutes:
u(t)
.
= c(t) + ψ
(
f(t)
)
, ψ′ > 0, ψ′′ < 0. (11)
Let the constant ρ be the family’s rate of time preference given that the
family could live forever. The adult’s probability of dying in a short time
dt is equal to mdt, where m is the adult’s mortality rate. Thus, e−mt is the
probability that an individual in the family will survive beyond the period
[0, t], and e−mtu(t) is the family’s expected temporary utility at time t. The
family’s expected utility for the planning period t ∈ [0,∞) is then [cf. (11)]
U
.
=
∫ ∞
0
log
[
c(t) + ψ
(
f(t)
)]
e−(m+ρ)tdt, ψ′ > 0, ψ′′ < 0. (12)
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The representative family maximizes its utility (12) by its per capita con-
sumption c and the allocation of labor and capital, (lc, ld, f, kc, kd), subject
to the accumulation of capital, (10), and the resource constraints (7), taking
the mortality rate m, the tax x and the poll transfer s as given. This max-
imization can be presented in two stages. First, the family maximizes per
capital output y by the allocation of labor and capital (lc, ld, f, kc, kd) subject
to the resource constraints (7), given the fertility rate f . This leads to the
function (cf. Appendix A)
y(k, f, x)
.
= max
(lc, ld, kc, kd) s.t. (7)
[F c(kd, ld) + (1− x)F d(kd, ld)] with
∂y
∂k
(x) > 0,
∂y
∂f
(x) < 0,
∂y
∂x
(k, f, x) = −yd < 0, ∂yd
∂x
< 0 and
∂yd
∂k
(x) > 0 ⇔ ∂yd
∂k
(x) =
lc
kc
∂yd
∂f
(x) > 0 ⇔ kd
ld
>
kc
lc
, (13)
Thus, production yd and the fertility rate f are then positively correlated if
and only if the dirty sector is more capital intensive:
∂yd
∂f
(x) > 0 ⇔ kd
ld
>
kc
lc
.
If the dirty sector is capital intensive, then a transfer of one unit of capital
from the clean sector to it decreases labor demand and wages. This lowers
the opportunity cost of child rearing and promotes fertility. Correspondingly,
with a capital intensive clean sector, that transfer increases labor demand and
wages, raising the opportunity cost of child rearing and hampering fertility.
In the second stage, the family maximizes the real-valued Hamiltonian
H .= log[c+ ψ(f)]+ φ[y(k, f, x) + s− c+ (m− f − δ)k], (14)
by per capita consumption c and the fertility rate f , where the co-state
variable φ(t) evolves according to
φ˙
.
=
dφ
dt
= (ρ+m)φ− ∂H
∂k
=
[
ρ+ δ + f − ∂y
∂k
(x)
]
φ,
lim
t→∞
φ(t)k(t)e−(m+ρ)t = 0. (15)
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The first-order conditions for the maximization of (14) by c and f are
∂H
∂c
=
1
c+ ψ(f)
− φ = 0, (16)
∂H
∂f
=
ψ′(f)
c+ ψ(f)
+ φ
[
∂y
∂f
(x)− k
]
= φ
[
ψ′(f) +
∂y
∂f
(x)− k
]
= 0. (17)
Given these conditions, the fertility rate is a function of capital per person,
k, and the tax rate x as follows [cf. (13)]:
f(k, x)
.
= (ψ′)−1
(
k − ∂y
∂f
(x)
)
,
fk
.
=
∂f
∂k
=
1
ψ′′
< 0,
fx
.
=
∂f
∂x
= − 1
ψ′′
∂2y
∂f∂x
=
1
ψ′′
∂yd
∂f
= fk
kc
lc
∂yd
∂k
< 0 ⇔ kd
ld
>
kc
lc
, (18)
where (ψ′)−1 is the inverse of the function ψ′. From (16) and (18) it follows
that consumption per capita is determined by
c = 1/φ− ψ(f(k, x)). (19)
Result (18) can be explained as follows. An increase in capital per head,
k, increases the marginal product of labor and the wage. A tax on the dirty
sector transfers resources from it to the clean sector. If the dirty sector
is more capital intensive, then this increases labor demand and the wage.
With a higher wage, people move from child rearing to production, which
discourages fertility.
4 Dynamics
We assume that the mortality rate m is an increasing function of total pol-
lution P which is a public good (e.g. air pollution, cf. Lehmijoki 2013):
m(P ), m′ > 0. (20)
Emissions Yd generate pollution P according to [cf. (8), (13) and (18)]
P˙
.
=
dP
dt
= Yd − ωP = yd
(
k, f(k, x), x
)
N − ωP, 0 < ω < 1, P (0) = P0,
(21)
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where the constant ω is the proportional absorbtion of pollution by nature.
Noting (18) and (20), the rate of population growth, (1), becomes
N˙
N
= f(k, x)−m(P ), N(0) = N0. (22)
Inserting the income function (13), the fertility function (18), per capita
consumption (19), the mortality function (20) and the government budget
constraint (3) (as s = xyd(k, f, x) = xyd
(
k, f(k, x), x
)
) back into (10), we
obtain the evolution of capital per head as follows:
k˙ = y
(
k, f(k, x), x
)
+ xyd
(
k, f(k, x), x
)− 1/φ+ ψ(f(k, x))+ (m− f − δ)k,
k(0) = k0. (23)
The dynamics of the economy is dictated by four differential equations:
the evolution of pollution (21), population (22) and capital per head, (23),
and the behavior of the co-state variable (15). This system has pollution P ,
population N and capital per head, k, as predetermined variables and the
co-state variable φ as a jump variable. In Appendix B, we show that with
a small tax x > 0 (or a small subsidy −x > 0), this system has three stable
roots and one unstable root. Thus, there is a saddle point solution and a
unique steady-state equilibrium.
5 The effect of the emission tax x
We denote the steady-state value of a variable by superscript (∗). In the
steady state, the state variables – population N , pollution P and capital per
head, k – must be constants. Given the system (15), (16), (18), (19), (21),
(22) and (23), we obtain that also the co-state variable φ is constant and
N˙ = φ˙ = 0 ⇔ m(P ∗) = f(k∗, x∗) = f ∗ = ∂y
∂k
(x)− ρ− δ,
P˙ = 0 ⇔ yd(k∗, f ∗, x)N∗ = ωP ∗,
k˙ = 0 ⇔ 1/φ∗ − ψ(f ∗) = c∗ = y(k∗, f ∗, x) + xyd
(
k∗, f ∗, x
)− δk∗. (24)
Differentiating equations (24) and (??) with respect to x and noting (12)
and (13) yield (cf. Appendix C)
dm∗
dx
=
df ∗
dx
< 0 ⇔ dP
∗
dx
< 0 ⇔ kd
ld
>
kc
lc
, (25)
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dN∗
dx
< 0 ⇔ kc
lc
<
1
2
[(
ω
N∗︸︷︷︸
+
1
m′︸︷︷︸
+
∂yd
∂k
+
∂yd
∂x︸︷︷︸
−
)(
∂yd
∂k
)−2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
− 1
fk︸︷︷︸
−
]
.
(26)
These results can be rephrased as follows:
Proposition 1 If the dirty sector is more capital intensive (i.e. the clean
sector more labor intensive), then an emission tax x decreases the fertility
rate f ∗, the mortality rate m∗ and pollution P ∗. Furthermore, if the clean
sector is labor intensive enough (i.e. kc/lc small enough), then the emission
tax x decreases total population (i.e. dN
∗
dx
< 0).
The emission tax shifts resources from the dirty to the clean sector. If the
dirty sector is more capital intensive, then the shift of resources increases
the demand for labor, raising the wage and encouraging labor to migrate
from child rearing to production. Thus, the fertility rate decreases, pollution
diminishes and the mortality rate falls. If the clean sector is labor inten-
sive enough (i.e. kc/lc small enough), then labor demand and the wages rise
substantially, generating an extensive migration from child rearing to pro-
duction. This decreases the size of population, further alleviating pollution.
Reversing the signs in (25) and (26) provides the following:
dm∗
dx
=
df ∗
dx
> 0 ⇔ dP
∗
dx
> 0 ⇔ kd
ld
<
kc
lc
,
dN∗
dx
> 0 ⇔ kc
lc
>
1
2
[(
ω
N∗︸︷︷︸
+
1
m′︸︷︷︸
+
∂yd
∂k
+
∂yd
∂x︸︷︷︸
−
)(
∂yd
∂k
)−2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
− 1
fk︸︷︷︸
−
]
.
Proposition 2 If the clean sector is more capital intensive, then an emission
tax x increases the fertility rate f ∗, the mortality rate m∗ and pollution P ∗.
Furthermore, if the clean sector is capital intensive enough (i.e. kc/lc big
enough), then the emission tax x increases total population (i.e. dN
∗
dx
> 0).
As before, the emission tax shifts resources to the clean sector. If this sector
is more capital intensive, then the demand for labor decreases, the wage falls
and labor migrates from production to child rearing. Fertility increases, pol-
lution aggravates and mortality rises. If the clean sector is capital intensive
enough (i.e. kc/lc big enough), then labor demand and the wages fall dras-
tically, generating an extensive flow from production to child rearing. This
increases population, further aggravating pollution.
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6 Discussion
In this article, we examine pollution-induced mortality when fertility is en-
dogenous and output is produced from labor and capital by two sectors, dirty
and clean. The sectors differ in capital intensity. In this setup, the emission
tax raises the relative price of dirty technology. If, as usually assumed, the
dirty sector is more capital intensive than the clean sector, then the emission
tax curbs dirty production, hampers pollution and transfers resources from
the capital-intensive dirty to the labor-intensive clean sector. This increases
labor demand and wages, encouraging labor to migrate from child rearing to
production. Consequently, the fertility rate decreases, population contracts,
total pollution alleviates and the mortality rate falls. If, in contrast, the clean
sector is more capital intensive, then the emission tax transfers resources to
the capital-intensive clean sector, decreasing labor demand and wages, and
attracting more people to child rearing. Thus, fertility increases, population
expands, total pollution culminates, raising the mortality rate.
While a great deal of caution should be exercised when a highly styl-
ized family-optimization model with two production sectors is used to ex-
plain the relationship of pollution, fertility, mortality and the accumulation
of capital, the following judgement nevertheless seems to be justified. So
far, the dirty sector has been more capital intensive than the clean sector.
However, there are signs that the relative factor intensity may reverse in fu-
ture. Many emerging clean technologies demand substantially capital, but
only marginally labor. In that case, an emission tax that reallocates factors
of production from the dirty to the clean sector makes people redundant in
production. If those people change into reproduction, then the expansion of
the clean sector may generate unintended natal side-effects that jeopardize
the targets of environmental policy.
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Appendix
A Results (13)
We obtain
y = max
lc, kc, ld, kd
s.t. (8)
[yc + (1− x)yd] = max
lc, kc, ld, kd
s.t. (8)
[F c(kc, lc) + (1− x)F d(kd, ld)]
= max
lc,kc,ld,kd
[F c(k − kd, n− ld) + (1− x)F d(kd, ld)].
Because the production functions F d and F c are linearly homogeneous [cf.
(5)], this implies
F dL(1, `d) = (1− x)F cL(1, `c), F dK(1, `d) = (1− x)F cK(1, `c),
`c
.
= lc/kc, `c
.
= lc/kc. (27)
The zero homogeneity of the functions F dL and F
c
L yields F
d
KL + F
d
LLd`d = 0,
F cKL + F
c
LLd`d = 0 and
`d = −F
d
KL
F dLL
, `c = −F
c
KL
F cLL
. (28)
Differentiating the equations in (27) totally, we obtain
F dLLd`d = F
c
LLd`c + F
c
Ldp, F
d
KLd`d = F
c
KLd`c + F
c
Kdp.
These can be written in the matrix form[
F dLL −(1− x)F cLL
F dKL −(1− x)F cKL
] [
d`d
d`c
]
+
[
F cL
F cK
]
dx = 0. (29)
Noting (5) and (28), we obtain the Jacobian of this system as follows:
J
.
=
∣∣∣∣ F dLL −(1− x)F cLLF dKL −(1− x)F cKL
∣∣∣∣ = p[F dKLF cLL − F dLLF cKL]
= F cLLF
d
LL
(
F dKL
F dLL
− F
c
KL
F cLL
)
= (1− x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
F cLL︸︷︷︸
−
F dLL︸︷︷︸
−
(−`d + `c) < 0
⇔ lc/kc = `c < `d = ld/kd. (30)
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Given this, (5) and (29), we obtain the functions
`d(x), `c(x), (31)
with derivatives
d`d
dx
= − 1
J
∣∣∣∣ F cL −F cLLF cK −F cKL
∣∣∣∣ = − 1J ( F cK︸︷︷︸
+
F cLL︸︷︷︸
−
− F cL︸︷︷︸
+
F cKL︸︷︷︸
+
) < 0 ⇔
d`c
dx
= − 1
J
∣∣∣∣ F dLL F cLF dKL F cK
∣∣∣∣ = − 1J ( F cK︸︷︷︸
+
F dLL︸︷︷︸
−
− F cL︸︷︷︸
+
F dKL︸︷︷︸
+
) < 0
⇔ J < 0 ⇔ lc/kc < ld/kd.
From (8) it follows that
kc = k − kd, 1− f = ld + lc = `dkd + `ckc = (`d − `c)kd + `ck.
Solving for kd and kd yields
kd =
1− f − `ck
`d − `c , kc = k −
1− f − `ck
`d − `c =
`dk − 1 + f
`d − `c .
Noting this, (5) and (31), we obtain
yd(k, f, x)
.
= F d(1, `d)kd = F
d
(
1, `d(x)
)1− f − `c(x)k
`d(x)− `c(x) ,
yc(k, f, x)
.
= F c(1, `c)kc = F
c
(
1, `c(x)
)`d(x)k − 1 + f
`d(x)− `c(x) ,
for which [cf. (30)]
∂yd
∂f
=
F d
(
1, `d(x)
)
`c(x)− `d(x) < 0 ⇔
∂yd
∂k
=
F d
(
1, `d(x)
)
`c(x)
`c(x)− `d(x) =
lc
kc
∂yd
∂f
< 0 ⇔
∂yc
∂f
=
F c
(
1, `c(x)
)
`d(x)− `c(x) > 0 ⇔
∂yc
∂k
=
F c
(
1, `c(x)
)
`d(x)
`d(x)− `c(x) =
ld
kd
∂yc
∂f
> 0 ⇔
lc
kc
= `c < `d =
ld
kd
;
∂2yd
∂k2
=
∂2yd
∂n2
=
∂2yd
∂k∂n
= 0. (32)
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B Saddle-point solution
Given (17), the system (15), (21), (22) and (23) can be written as follows:
φ˙
φ
= ρ+ δ + f(k, x)− ∂y
∂k
(x), P˙ = yd
(
k, f(k, x), x
)
N − ωP,
N˙
N
= f(k, x)−m(P ),
k˙ = y
(
k, f(k, x), x
)
+ xyd
(
k, f(k, x), x
)− 1/φ+ ψ(f(k, x))
+ [m− f(k, x)− δ]k with
∂k˙
∂f
=
∂y
∂f
+ ψ′ − k︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+x
∂yd
∂f
= x
∂yd
∂f
.
We linearize this system in the neighborhood of the steady state, where
φ˙ = P˙ = N˙ = k˙ = 0:
0 0 0 fk
0 −ω yd
(
∂yd
∂k
+ ∂yd
∂f
fk
)
N
0 −m′ 0 fk
φ−2 0 0 ∂y
∂k
+ x
(
∂yd
∂k
+ ∂yd
∂f
fk
)− δ


dφ
dP
dN
dk
 = 0.
The characteristic equation of this system is∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−λ 0 0 fk
0 −ω − λ yd
(
∂yd
∂k
+ ∂yd
∂f
fk
)
N
0 −m′ −λ fk
φ−2 0 0 ∂y
∂k
+ x
(
∂yd
∂k
+ ∂yd
∂f
fk
)− δ − λ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= −λ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
−ω − λ yd
(
∂yd
∂k
+ ∂yd
∂f
fk
)
N
−m′ −λ fk
0 0 ∂y
∂k
+ x
(
∂yd
∂k
+ ∂yd
∂f
fk
)− δ − λ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
− 1
φ2
∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 fk
−ω − λ yd
(
∂yd
∂k
+ ∂yd
∂f
fk
)
N
−m′ −λ fk
∣∣∣∣∣∣
= −λ
[
∂y
∂k
+ x
(
∂yd
∂k
+
∂yd
∂f
fk
)
− δ − λ
] ∣∣∣∣ −ω − λ yd−m′ −λ
∣∣∣∣
− fk
φ2
∣∣∣∣ −ω − λ yd−m′ −λ
∣∣∣∣
12
={
λ2 −
[
∂y
∂k
+ x
(
∂yd
∂k
+
∂yd
∂f
fk
)
− δ
]
λ− fk
φ2
}
(λ2 + ωλ+m′yd) = 0.
This yields two polynomes. The first of these is λ2 + ωλ + m′yd = 0, which
has roots
λ1,2 = −ω
2
±
√
ω2 − 4m′yd.
Because 4m′yd > 0 [cf. (20)], there are two stable roots λ1 and λ2.
In the neighborhood of no taxation x = 0, the second polynome is
λ2 −
(
∂y
∂k
− δ
)
λ− fk
φ2
= 0.
This has one stable and one unstable root:
λ3 =
1
2
(
∂y
∂k
− δ
)
+
1
2
√√√√√
(
∂y
∂k
− δ
)2
+
4
φ2︸︷︷︸
+
fk︸︷︷︸
−
<
1
2
(
∂y
∂k
− δ
)
+
1
2
√(
∂y
∂k
− δ
)2
= 0,
λ4 =
1
2
(
∂y
∂k
− δ
)
− 1
2
√√√√√
(
∂y
∂k
− δ
)2
+
4
φ2︸︷︷︸
+
fk︸︷︷︸
−
>
1
2
(
∂y
∂k
− δ
)
− 1
2
√(
∂y
∂k
− δ
)2
= 0.
C Proof of proposition 1
Differentiating equations (24) with respect to x and noting (12), (13) and
(18) yield
fk
dk∗
dx
+ fx =
df ∗
dx
=
∂2y
∂k∂x
= −∂yd
∂k
< 0 ⇔ dP
∗
dx
=
1
m′︸︷︷︸
+
df ∗
dx
< 0
⇔ kd
ld
>
kc
lc
,
dk∗
dx
= −fx
fk
− 1
fk
∂yd
∂k
= −kc
lc
∂yd
∂k
− 1
fk
∂yd
∂k
= −∂yd
∂k
(
kc
lc︸︷︷︸
+
+
1
fk︸︷︷︸
−
)
,
13
dN∗
dx
=
1
yd
[
ω
dP ∗
dx
−N∗
(
∂yd
∂k
dk∗
dx
+
∂yd
∂f
df ∗
dx
+
∂yd
∂x
)]
=
N∗
yd
[
ω
N∗
dP ∗
dx
− ∂yd
∂k
dk∗
dx
− ∂yd
∂f
df ∗
dx
− ∂yd
∂x
]
=
N∗
yd
[
ω
N∗
1
m′
df ∗
dx
+
(
∂yd
∂k
)2(
kc
lc
+
1
fk
)
− kc
lc
∂yd
∂k
df ∗
dx
− ∂yd
∂x
]
=
N∗
yd
[
− ω
N∗
1
m′
∂yd
∂k
+
(
∂yd
∂k
)2(
kc
lc
+
1
fk
)
+
kc
lc
(
∂yd
∂k
)2
− ∂yd
∂x
]
=
N∗
yd︸︷︷︸
+
[(
∂yd
∂k
)2(
2
kc
lc
+
1
fk
)
− ω
N∗
1
m′
∂yd
∂k
− ∂yd
∂x
]
< 0
⇔
(
∂yd
∂k
)2(
2
kc
lc
+
1
fk
)
<
ω
N∗
1
m′
∂yd
∂k
+
∂yd
∂x
⇔ kc
lc
<
1
2
[(
ω
N∗︸︷︷︸
+
1
m′︸︷︷︸
+
∂yd
∂k
+
∂yd
∂x︸︷︷︸
−
)(
∂yd
∂k
)−2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
− 1
fk︸︷︷︸
−
]
.
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